Smarick could just as easily have framed his piece as the Scalian vs Rehnquistian approach to lawclerk hiring. But that might have diluted the partisan/ideological subtext of his piece…
Frank Easterbrook is the one federal judge who has tried Will's suggested approach to clerk hiring. Look what it's done for his performance and reputation!
If the Fed is bifurcated into its "regulatory" and its "coin money" powers, I'm not sure how this really solves the problem. Presumably, there would be the "OCC clone" Federal Reserve that executes regulatory power and the Board or Director would be appointed by the President. So far so good, makes sense.
Then, there would be the "monetary policy" Federal Reserve whose members are....? Executive? Legislative? If these members speak for Congress collectively, wouldn't they have to be appointed by the President, like the Comptroller General does?
Or would this be more similar to the Director of the Congressional Budget Office who, of course, operates in an advisory-only capacity to Congress?
I recall the Supreme Court holding that each House can appoint individuals to perform certain duties, but when the Houses together are acting, it requires Presidential appointment and confirmation in the Senate. I believe it came up in the context of the head of the GAO or maybe the head of the Library of Congress? Maybe Bowsher? Perhaps I'm misremembering.
Still seems like this is a little under-specified.
The link on "The Souterian and Rehnqustian Views of Legal Talent" is incorrect, it goes to your federal reserve piece.
For others’ ease, the right link is https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/the-souterian-and-rehnquistian-views-of-legal-talent-andy-smarick/
Thanks, sorry, and fixed.
Smarick could just as easily have framed his piece as the Scalian vs Rehnquistian approach to lawclerk hiring. But that might have diluted the partisan/ideological subtext of his piece…
I totally clicked on the article about removal expecting an interesting dissection of 28 USC 1441.
Frank Easterbrook is the one federal judge who has tried Will's suggested approach to clerk hiring. Look what it's done for his performance and reputation!
If the Fed is bifurcated into its "regulatory" and its "coin money" powers, I'm not sure how this really solves the problem. Presumably, there would be the "OCC clone" Federal Reserve that executes regulatory power and the Board or Director would be appointed by the President. So far so good, makes sense.
Then, there would be the "monetary policy" Federal Reserve whose members are....? Executive? Legislative? If these members speak for Congress collectively, wouldn't they have to be appointed by the President, like the Comptroller General does?
Or would this be more similar to the Director of the Congressional Budget Office who, of course, operates in an advisory-only capacity to Congress?
I recall the Supreme Court holding that each House can appoint individuals to perform certain duties, but when the Houses together are acting, it requires Presidential appointment and confirmation in the Senate. I believe it came up in the context of the head of the GAO or maybe the head of the Library of Congress? Maybe Bowsher? Perhaps I'm misremembering.
Still seems like this is a little under-specified.