Michael McConnell is in the Washington Post proposing that Congress preserve the independence of the Federal Reserve by splitting the agency. See this previous post for my discussion of whether the Court could kludge a similar result on its own.
Andy Smarick on the The Souterian and Rehnqustian Views of Legal Talent — i.e., preferences for different universities in law clerk hiring. Obviously I believe the best strategy has not yet been tried, namely hiring only University of Chicago graduates.
From Mahmoud v. Taylor to Strasbourg: The Substantial-Interference Test in Public Education, by Jorge Barrera-Rojas. A harmonization of the constitutional standard in Mahmoud (discussed on the podcast at length) with an analogous problem under the European Convention. Beyond my expertise, but very interesting!
Several interesting things in the topside amicus briefs on reargument in Louisiana v. Callais (the case about the constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), including this one from Nick Stephanopoulos, this one from Travis Crum (with Dan Epps on the brief as counsel), and this one from Kerrel Murray, drawing from forthcoming article I had not known about, False Conflict: Colorblindness and Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.
The latest in the removal debates — Disagreement and Historical Argument or How Not To Think About Removal, by Katz, Rosenblum, and Manners.
Discussion about this post
No posts
The link on "The Souterian and Rehnqustian Views of Legal Talent" is incorrect, it goes to your federal reserve piece.
If the Fed is bifurcated into its "regulatory" and its "coin money" powers, I'm not sure how this really solves the problem. Presumably, there would be the "OCC clone" Federal Reserve that executes regulatory power and the Board or Director would be appointed by the President. So far so good, makes sense.
Then, there would be the "monetary policy" Federal Reserve whose members are....? Executive? Legislative? If these members speak for Congress collectively, wouldn't they have to be appointed by the President, like the Comptroller General does?
Or would this be more similar to the Director of the Congressional Budget Office who, of course, operates in an advisory-only capacity to Congress?
I recall the Supreme Court holding that each House can appoint individuals to perform certain duties, but when the Houses together are acting, it requires Presidential appointment and confirmation in the Senate. I believe it came up in the context of the head of the GAO or maybe the head of the Library of Congress? Maybe Bowsher? Perhaps I'm misremembering.
Still seems like this is a little under-specified.