1. Other than a very brief comment at the end, your analysis did not mention Purcell relative to this case. On the AO podcast yesterday, Sarah or David mentioned that their view was Purcell didn’t apply to SCOTUS decisions. Why wouldn’t Purcell have prevented map changes post the Calais decision for the 2026 elections?
2. Could you elaborate on the “similarly situated” concept and how that term is defined and how it is applied? David talked about it on AO yesterday too. I came away from his discussion thinking it would be okay for a state to say no people in x city can vote, since all those people are similarly situated. Hard to believe that can be right.
I feel like Dan is usually extremely reserved so hearing him say "odious" a few times stood out to me, but I would have liked to hear more push back.
I was especially unconvinced about Will's defense of partisanship vs race and of whom this will benefit in the long run. Will kept saying that black people have just as much opportunity to elect republicans still, but I don't think that can be true since their compact living districts have been split up! Similarly republicans have had 60+ years to enact policy and convince black people to vote for them and they seemingly haven't been interested (whereas they have made overtures and inroads at times with other minority groups). Combining this decision with Rucho (which I think is the most undemocratic and anti-rule of law decision of my life time) I think just means a clear road map for legal racial gerrymandering. I also think Rucho is doubly bad because since the US supreme court has wiped their hands of partisan gerrymandering it is leaving states like Florida to blatantly ignore their own state constitution to implement republican gerrymanders without any recourse other than an extremely long and difficult process of impeachment and elections.
I've read things like Pildes' take on Callais, but all of that seems like pie-in-the-sky "what ifs". E.g. Pildes' says that this might backfire if dems take control in '28 and pass voting rights legislation. This just skims over the fact that right now that would require dems to win at least 60 seats in the extremely undemocratic senate (most forcasters put this likelihood around 0%). Pildes also mentions democrats could spread black voters out in states they control to counteract southern states changes, but this is exactly the type of voter dilution the voting rights act was supposed to stop!
I was curious to look into judge Easterbrook's proposals, but was rather unsurprised to find that scholars find that such an approach would lead to fewer minority representatives and decidedly have a net republican benefit (e.g. https://yalelawjournal.org/article/the-race-blind-future-of-voting-rights)
Finally I'll say that many of the arguments that "we don't know the long term partisan effect" seem like they would fit just as well defending the seemingly race neutral Jim Crow laws -- poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements, grandfather clauses, etc. That sits extremely unease with me. I'm not sure when this episode was recorded, but since the decision came down Louisiana and Tennessee have already rushed to implement new GOP gerrymanders, and GOP appointees on the VA supreme court have struck down the DEM gerrymander there. It seems like there is already plenty of on the ground evidence that this decision is benefiting republicans and just speculation (almost entirely from defenders of Callais) that this could have a different partisan valence in the long run.
I haven't dug into much of the other legal analyses of the Callais decision, but I have been reading about the statistical analyses of partisanship vs race (e.g. https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/2026-05-08-simple-math-error-scotus-callais-vra) and it's reinforcing my belief that this decision was largely driven by a court that wanted to get rid of section 2 and just found Rucho as a convenient shield to do so.
Would have loved to hear you all talk about justice Roberts long history with the voting rights act and why that might have been part of his calculus not to be the author of this decision (since he is often the author of these big cases).
Dan's argument is contradictory to me. According to him:
1. Political gerrymandering is bad.
2. Racial gerrymandering is necessary and good because it helps minorities.
3. But race and political preferences are inextricably intertwined.
But if race and political preferences are so intertwined, political gerrymandering is necessarily racial gerrymandering. Indeed, political gerrymandering becomes unavoidable if race-based gerrymandering is required. And if racial gerrymandering is necessary and good, then what is wrong with political gerrymandering if race and politics are so linked?
I don't like to ascribe bad-faith to people. But it seems Dan's problem with political gerrymandering is that it sometimes works to the benefit of Republicans, and is therefore bad. But racial gerrymandering that "benefits" minorities (I disagree that it actually benefits them) is good because it usually benefits Democrats. In other words, because race and politics are so intertwined, political gerrymandering is good if it benefits Democrats, but we can't say out loud that it's good because then that gives Republicans license to engage in political gerrymandering.
Seems to me that Dan's position is...what's the word y'all kept using to describe the Court's opinion? Oh, yeah...dishonest.
Is there a petition anywhere to replace Dan with a left-leaning law professor who knows what they are talking about?
Two questions:
1. Other than a very brief comment at the end, your analysis did not mention Purcell relative to this case. On the AO podcast yesterday, Sarah or David mentioned that their view was Purcell didn’t apply to SCOTUS decisions. Why wouldn’t Purcell have prevented map changes post the Calais decision for the 2026 elections?
2. Could you elaborate on the “similarly situated” concept and how that term is defined and how it is applied? David talked about it on AO yesterday too. I came away from his discussion thinking it would be okay for a state to say no people in x city can vote, since all those people are similarly situated. Hard to believe that can be right.
I feel like Dan is usually extremely reserved so hearing him say "odious" a few times stood out to me, but I would have liked to hear more push back.
I was especially unconvinced about Will's defense of partisanship vs race and of whom this will benefit in the long run. Will kept saying that black people have just as much opportunity to elect republicans still, but I don't think that can be true since their compact living districts have been split up! Similarly republicans have had 60+ years to enact policy and convince black people to vote for them and they seemingly haven't been interested (whereas they have made overtures and inroads at times with other minority groups). Combining this decision with Rucho (which I think is the most undemocratic and anti-rule of law decision of my life time) I think just means a clear road map for legal racial gerrymandering. I also think Rucho is doubly bad because since the US supreme court has wiped their hands of partisan gerrymandering it is leaving states like Florida to blatantly ignore their own state constitution to implement republican gerrymanders without any recourse other than an extremely long and difficult process of impeachment and elections.
I've read things like Pildes' take on Callais, but all of that seems like pie-in-the-sky "what ifs". E.g. Pildes' says that this might backfire if dems take control in '28 and pass voting rights legislation. This just skims over the fact that right now that would require dems to win at least 60 seats in the extremely undemocratic senate (most forcasters put this likelihood around 0%). Pildes also mentions democrats could spread black voters out in states they control to counteract southern states changes, but this is exactly the type of voter dilution the voting rights act was supposed to stop!
I was curious to look into judge Easterbrook's proposals, but was rather unsurprised to find that scholars find that such an approach would lead to fewer minority representatives and decidedly have a net republican benefit (e.g. https://yalelawjournal.org/article/the-race-blind-future-of-voting-rights)
Finally I'll say that many of the arguments that "we don't know the long term partisan effect" seem like they would fit just as well defending the seemingly race neutral Jim Crow laws -- poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements, grandfather clauses, etc. That sits extremely unease with me. I'm not sure when this episode was recorded, but since the decision came down Louisiana and Tennessee have already rushed to implement new GOP gerrymanders, and GOP appointees on the VA supreme court have struck down the DEM gerrymander there. It seems like there is already plenty of on the ground evidence that this decision is benefiting republicans and just speculation (almost entirely from defenders of Callais) that this could have a different partisan valence in the long run.
I haven't dug into much of the other legal analyses of the Callais decision, but I have been reading about the statistical analyses of partisanship vs race (e.g. https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/2026-05-08-simple-math-error-scotus-callais-vra) and it's reinforcing my belief that this decision was largely driven by a court that wanted to get rid of section 2 and just found Rucho as a convenient shield to do so.
Would have loved to hear you all talk about justice Roberts long history with the voting rights act and why that might have been part of his calculus not to be the author of this decision (since he is often the author of these big cases).
Dan's argument is contradictory to me. According to him:
1. Political gerrymandering is bad.
2. Racial gerrymandering is necessary and good because it helps minorities.
3. But race and political preferences are inextricably intertwined.
But if race and political preferences are so intertwined, political gerrymandering is necessarily racial gerrymandering. Indeed, political gerrymandering becomes unavoidable if race-based gerrymandering is required. And if racial gerrymandering is necessary and good, then what is wrong with political gerrymandering if race and politics are so linked?
I don't like to ascribe bad-faith to people. But it seems Dan's problem with political gerrymandering is that it sometimes works to the benefit of Republicans, and is therefore bad. But racial gerrymandering that "benefits" minorities (I disagree that it actually benefits them) is good because it usually benefits Democrats. In other words, because race and politics are so intertwined, political gerrymandering is good if it benefits Democrats, but we can't say out loud that it's good because then that gives Republicans license to engage in political gerrymandering.
Seems to me that Dan's position is...what's the word y'all kept using to describe the Court's opinion? Oh, yeah...dishonest.
When are we going to deal - as the Founders did- with the
rights of Americans (whether voters, citizens, or otherwise) as INDIVIDUAL rights, as opposed to group (however defined) rights?