Regarding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, I don't think the note fairly quotes Lincoln as supporting Congressional power to enact it. He is quoted as being willing to give slaveholders “any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives." The full statement he gave in a speech was:
"When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them, not grudgingly, but fully, and fairly; and I would give them any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not, in its stringency, be more likely to carry a free man into slavery, than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one."
Likening enslavement to capital punishment (which he did on more this occasion), he clearly objected to the law on either due process or Article III grounds, or both.
As much as I want the government to make psychedelics lawful that argument is pretty ridiculous. Indeed, it seems far more plausible to try to ground any such right in a Griswold style claim to autonomy and control over one's body than this epistemic right.
And far from being more limited than cognitive liberty it seems far more expansive. For instance, would it encompass a right by psychogists to conduct RCTs without patient consent? Say it's a situation where both types of treatment are considered to be within the professional standard of care. As silly as I believe much of the laws around IRBs may be that seems to go much too far.
Seems like the author hedged incorrectly, using "significantly" as a hedge and substituting "there is no reason to believe..." for "I don't believe...". There are lots of reasons to believe the process has changed since 2005—the court's composition has changed, the number and profile of the applications has changed, and so on.
Regarding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, I don't think the note fairly quotes Lincoln as supporting Congressional power to enact it. He is quoted as being willing to give slaveholders “any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives." The full statement he gave in a speech was:
"When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them, not grudgingly, but fully, and fairly; and I would give them any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not, in its stringency, be more likely to carry a free man into slavery, than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one."
Likening enslavement to capital punishment (which he did on more this occasion), he clearly objected to the law on either due process or Article III grounds, or both.
As much as I want the government to make psychedelics lawful that argument is pretty ridiculous. Indeed, it seems far more plausible to try to ground any such right in a Griswold style claim to autonomy and control over one's body than this epistemic right.
And far from being more limited than cognitive liberty it seems far more expansive. For instance, would it encompass a right by psychogists to conduct RCTs without patient consent? Say it's a situation where both types of treatment are considered to be within the professional standard of care. As silly as I believe much of the laws around IRBs may be that seems to go much too far.
Seems like the author hedged incorrectly, using "significantly" as a hedge and substituting "there is no reason to believe..." for "I don't believe...". There are lots of reasons to believe the process has changed since 2005—the court's composition has changed, the number and profile of the applications has changed, and so on.