Re "medical consensus": Let's just suppose the medical consensus were that electro-shock therapy or lobotomies were the best treatments. A state, wanting its doctors to reflect medical consensus, said doctors can recommend electro-shock therapy or lobotomies, but they can't talk patients out of those treatments or say those treatments are ineffective. Is that okay under Jackson's dissent?
The truth is, science and medicine are rarely settled. Just look at the state of medical science in the 1800s and early 1900s, and you'll see some wild stuff that was accepted by a lot of people. The First Amendment exists largely to allow such debates to play out.
I was listening to the Advisory Opinions podcast released today that covered Chiles. They talked a lot about viewpoint vs. content based discrimination. Can someone explain the difference? For example, is it viewpoint discrimination for a state medical licensing board to say "We don't want doctors advising patients with Covid to drink bleach as a treatment to cure Covid"?
Re: Chiles. Thank you for both pointing out around 37:00 how the state’s use of the label ‘conversion therapy’ for ‘voluntary talk therapy’ is strikingly inaccurate. Asking a young person in gender distress to explore why they feel that way is not conversion, but the use of that deceptive label has led to bans in several countries of reasonable practices that could help patients.
Regarding movies and TV surely sometimes it's nice to have that extra length even if it results in a less tight story ark. Ultimately, the value is to provide entertainment and the greater length means more hours of entertainment. Also, IMO one of the great benefits of television is that it can start to feel like you know the characters and you therefore care about them in their continuing adventures.
Star Trek movies are nice enough but movies alone wouldn't make it what it is.
Regarding your discussion of the Colorado law couldn't you defend a position something like this (not suggesting the court adopted anything of the kind merely that there is a coherent line you could draw):
State regulation can require medical practitioners to inform patients of the consensus (or even the state's view of) the evidence about the consequences of a given treatment. Arguably that is the boundary of the practice of medicine. This matches up with what certain court members have said about there being less value in false statements of fact. However, what it can't do (on this view) is ban those practitioners from offering advice that urges you to nevertheless not take a treatment just because most people would find it desirable given those effects.
For instance, you can't falsely inform people that vaccines cause autism but you would have a first amendment interest in saying: the state requires me to tell you that vaccines have an extremely low side effect risk and protect against grave risks however, despite that, it is an unnatural intervention and I urge you not to get them and instead be natural/trust in god/etc... And maybe the state could even require practitioners who give such advice to disclose it upfront.
I think it gets more complex if the practitioner wants to convey the message that all the evidence the state presents about the effect of a treatment is mistaken (tho I think it could be extended to cover it) but this distinction makes a great deal of sense to me.
Since y'all were talking about the history of licensing and speech, particularly for doctors and lawyers, you may be interested in this forthcoming article from my colleagues Paul Sherman and Dan Nelson, The (Weak) Historical Case for Licensing Speech, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6183159
Re "medical consensus": Let's just suppose the medical consensus were that electro-shock therapy or lobotomies were the best treatments. A state, wanting its doctors to reflect medical consensus, said doctors can recommend electro-shock therapy or lobotomies, but they can't talk patients out of those treatments or say those treatments are ineffective. Is that okay under Jackson's dissent?
The truth is, science and medicine are rarely settled. Just look at the state of medical science in the 1800s and early 1900s, and you'll see some wild stuff that was accepted by a lot of people. The First Amendment exists largely to allow such debates to play out.
I was listening to the Advisory Opinions podcast released today that covered Chiles. They talked a lot about viewpoint vs. content based discrimination. Can someone explain the difference? For example, is it viewpoint discrimination for a state medical licensing board to say "We don't want doctors advising patients with Covid to drink bleach as a treatment to cure Covid"?
Re: Chiles. Thank you for both pointing out around 37:00 how the state’s use of the label ‘conversion therapy’ for ‘voluntary talk therapy’ is strikingly inaccurate. Asking a young person in gender distress to explore why they feel that way is not conversion, but the use of that deceptive label has led to bans in several countries of reasonable practices that could help patients.
Regarding movies and TV surely sometimes it's nice to have that extra length even if it results in a less tight story ark. Ultimately, the value is to provide entertainment and the greater length means more hours of entertainment. Also, IMO one of the great benefits of television is that it can start to feel like you know the characters and you therefore care about them in their continuing adventures.
Star Trek movies are nice enough but movies alone wouldn't make it what it is.
Regarding your discussion of the Colorado law couldn't you defend a position something like this (not suggesting the court adopted anything of the kind merely that there is a coherent line you could draw):
State regulation can require medical practitioners to inform patients of the consensus (or even the state's view of) the evidence about the consequences of a given treatment. Arguably that is the boundary of the practice of medicine. This matches up with what certain court members have said about there being less value in false statements of fact. However, what it can't do (on this view) is ban those practitioners from offering advice that urges you to nevertheless not take a treatment just because most people would find it desirable given those effects.
For instance, you can't falsely inform people that vaccines cause autism but you would have a first amendment interest in saying: the state requires me to tell you that vaccines have an extremely low side effect risk and protect against grave risks however, despite that, it is an unnatural intervention and I urge you not to get them and instead be natural/trust in god/etc... And maybe the state could even require practitioners who give such advice to disclose it upfront.
I think it gets more complex if the practitioner wants to convey the message that all the evidence the state presents about the effect of a treatment is mistaken (tho I think it could be extended to cover it) but this distinction makes a great deal of sense to me.
Since y'all were talking about the history of licensing and speech, particularly for doctors and lawyers, you may be interested in this forthcoming article from my colleagues Paul Sherman and Dan Nelson, The (Weak) Historical Case for Licensing Speech, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6183159